Fordham Law School

FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History
All Decisions

Housing Court Decisions Project

2022-07-07

5th & 106th St. Assoc. LP v. Hunt

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/housing_court_all

Recommended Citation
"5th & 106th St. Assoc. LP v. Hunt" (2022). All Decisions. 488.
https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/housing_court_all/488

This Housing Court Decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Housing Court Decisions Project at
FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. It has been accepted for inclusion in All Decisions by
an authorized administrator of FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information,
please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu.

[*1]
5th & 106th St. Assoc. LP v Hunt
2022 NY Slip Op 22205
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Bacdayan, J.
Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.
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Official Reports.

Decided on July 7, 2022
Civil Court of the CIty of New York, New York County
5th and 106th Street Associates LP, Petitioner,
against
Martha Hunt, Respondent, "JANE DOE" "JOHN DOE"
Respondentundertenants.

Index No. LT05473519/NY

Rose & Rose (Paul Coppe, Esq.), for the petitioner
Outerbridge Law Altagracia PierreOuterbridge, Esq.), for the respondentMartha Hunt
Karen May Bacdayan, J.
Recitation, as required by CPLR 2219 (a) of the papers considered in review of this
motion by NYSCEF Doc No:
Papers NYSCEF Doc No.
Notice of Appearance 16
Notice of ERAP filing 17
Order to Show Cause and supporting documents (motion seq 3) 1628

Crossmotion, affirmation in opposition to motion sequence 3,
and supporting documents (seq 4) 2943
Appellate Term CPLR 5704 (b) order 45
Attorney affirmation in further support (motion seq 3) 4649
PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND BACKGROUND
This is a holdover proceeding based on respondent's failure to complete the required
annual recertification process for her apartment which is located in a HUD subsidized
projectbased Section 8 premises. Respondent is a 72year old retired school teacher who
lives alone, and is on a "fixed income." (NYCEF Doc No. 20, Hunt affidavit ¶ 4, NYSCEF
Doc No. 31 ¶ 8; NYSCEF Doc No. 46, respondent's attorney's affirmation in opposition at 7.)
Respondent contends that she is a rent stabilized tenant who is not subject to the HUD rules
and regulations. (NYSCEF Doc No. 19, memorandum of law in support of order to show
cause at 4; NYSCEF Doc No. 31 ¶ 4.)
On September 11, 2019, the Hon. Frances Ortiz granted summary judgment in favor of
[*2]petitioner on its claims holding that "there is no basis in law" to support respondent's
argument that she is entitled to a rent stabilized lease. (NYSCEF Doc No. 8 at 4.) The court
entered a judgment in favor of petitioner, and stayed issuance of the warrant for 30 days to
enable respondent to cure her breach and recertify. (Id. at 45.) A warrant issued but
execution was stayed due to altered court procedures occasioned by the COVID19
pandemic, and then due to a stay on the proceedings administratively placed as a result of the
respondent having filed a hardship declaration pursuant to the COVID Emergency Eviction
and Foreclosure Prevention Act ("CEEFPA".) (L 2021, c 417, part C, subpart A § 4.) When
the hardship declaration stay expired, Petitioner filed a motion to execute on the warrant,
which motion was granted, after argument on April 26, 2022 by the Hon. Judge Finkelstein.
[FN1] The

order stayed execution of the warrant through May 31, 2022. (NYSCEF Doc No.
15.) Thereafter, on May 12, 2022, Outerbridge Law appeared for respondent, and on June 6,
2022 respondent alerted the court that she had filed an Emergency Rental Assistance
Program ("ERAP") application which had the effect of further staying this proceeding. (L
2021, c 56, part BB, subpart A, § 8.)
On June 9, 2022, respondent filed a proposed order to show cause with the court.
(NYSCEF Doc No. 18.) On June 14, 2022 this court signed the order to show cause but
struck respondent's request to reargue the September 11, 2019 decision and judgment of
Judge Ortiz, and respondent's request to vacate the April 26, 2022 order of Judge Finkelstein

allowing for execution of the warrant. Pursuant to CPLR 5704 (b), respondent appealed this
court's striking of the two aforementioned requests for relief to the Appellate Term, and the
Appellate Term returned the order to show cause to this court for consideration of the relief
that had been stricken. (NYSCEF Doc No. 45 at 1.) Also on June 14, 2022, respondent filed a
notice of appeal of the April 26, 2022 order of this court. (NYSEF Doc No.24.)
Petitioner has now crossmoved to vacate the ERAP stay and for sanctions against
respondent for filing an ERAP application, and against her attorney for advising respondent,
an ineligible individual, to file the ERAP application. Oral argument was held on the record
on June 28, 2022 and June 29, 2022.

DISCUSSION
Petitioner's Motion to Vacate the ERAP Stay
Petitioner has moved to vacate the automatic ERAP stay on the following bases:
Respondent's application is frivolous and intended only to delay the proceeding; respondent
is not incomeeligible for ERAP (specifically respondent's reported 2018 income of $143,113
from New York State pension and Social Security is above 120% of the Area Median Income
maximum for eligibility in New York County); respondent has been paying what she believes
to be her legal monthly rent each month and there is nothing now for ERAP to pay unless
respondent believes her rent is higher than $1,255.00 per month; respondent's tenancy has
been terminated and so she no longer has an obligation to pay rent; and the application is
futile because it she lives in subsidized housing which is a last priority under the statute even
if the ERAP program were currently funded. (NYSCEF Doc No. 30 ¶¶ 5 15, 16.)
Respondent opposes petitioner's motion and argues that the "ERAP legislation does not
provide a mechanism for challenging an ERAP stay." (NYSCEF Doc No. 46, respondent's
memorandum of law in support of motion sequence 3 at 13.) Respondent's attorney states
that respondent is a "tenant" obligated to pay "rent" as defined by the ERAP statute and that
respondent has continued to pay, and petitioner has continued to demand, payment of rent.
(Id. at 57.) Respondent's attorney argues that respondent need not be eligible under all the
eligibility criteria and that respondent is specifically eligible under "bullet point three."[FN2]
(Id.) Without addressing whether respondent's annual income is still $143,113 per year,
respondent's attorney states that petitioner's speculation as to what her income is now as
opposed to what it was in 2018 "is tonedeaf to the struggles people on a fixed income are

facing." (Id. at 7.) Regarding sanctions, respondent's attorney cites to this court's decision in
Park Tower S. Co. LLC v Simons, for the proposition that an attorney who makes a good faith
argument that the automatic stay provisions apply to their client, should not be sanctioned.
(2022 NY Slip Op 22192, — Misc 3d — [Civ Ct, New York County 2022].)
Respondent's Eligibility for ERAP and the Automatic Stay
The court has the authority to consider whether or not to vacate an ERAP stay. (See e.g.
Laporte v Garcia, 2022 NY Slip Op 22126, *1 [Civ Ct, Bronx County 2022], citing 2986
Briggs LLC v Evans, 2022 NY Slip Op. 50215 [U] [Civ Ct, Bronx County 2022].) Indeed, to
find otherwise would raise constitutional issues analogous to those at issue in Chrysafis v
Marks, 594 — US —, 141 S Ct 2482 (2021). In Chrysafis, the Covid Emergency Eviction
and Foreclosure Prevention Act ("CEEFPA") was enjoined because it did not allow a
landlord to challenge a tenant's selfcertified experience of a hardship which resulted in an
automatic stay of proceedings. CEEFPA as modified by the L 2021, c 417, passed just three
weeks after the decision in Chrysafis, addressed the Supreme Court's due process concerns
and allowed for a motion to be made before the court to determine whether the tenant was, in
fact, entitled to the continuation of an automatic stay occasioned by the filing of a hardship
declaration.
Similarly, in the context of ERAP, the tenant "selfattest[s]" to eligibility for ERAP
funding and receives the benefit of an automatic stay on proceedings as a result. (L 2021, c
56, part BB, subpart A, § 6 [6].) Thus, when a landlord challenges the automatic ERAP stay,
the court must determine whether the tenant has made a showing that it is so entitled, or risk
infringing on petitioner's due process rights.
The facts herein are unlike those in the decisions in which courts have either granted or
denied a petitioner's motion to vacate an ERAP stay based on the courts' varying
interpretations of whether the legislature intended the stay to benefit an "occupant," or a
"holdover" tenant in an unregulated tenancy, a superintendent in residence only as an incident
to their employment, or a person against whom a warrant has already issued. Petitioner's
argument is not based on "absurd results" of continuing the stay herein, or the "futility" of
finding respondent eligible for the stay because an occupant's eviction in inevitable. Rather,
petitioner argues that respondent is not eligible because she receives income in excess of
what a single household can earn to be eligible [*3]under the statute, and that she has already
paid what she claims to be the maximum legal rent for each month that ERAP funds would
be dispersed, unless she now agrees that her rent should be higher, which she does not.

The statute sets forth the eligibility factors for ERAP. (L 2021, c 56, part BB, subpart A,
§ 5 [1] [a] [i] — [iv].) A "household shall be eligible if it:
(i) is a tenant or occupant obligated to pay rent in their primary residence in the
state of New York . . . provided however that occupants of federal or state funded
subsidized public housing authorities or other federal or state funded subsidized
housing that limits the household's share of the rent to a set percentage of income
shall only be eligible to the extent that funds are remaining after serving all other
eligible populations;
(ii) includes an individual who has qualified for unemployment or experienced a
reduction in household income, incurred significant costs, or experienced other
financial hardship due, directly or indirectly, to the COVID—19 outbreak;
(iii) demonstrates a risk of experiencing homelessness or housing instability; and
(emphasis added)
(iv) has a household income at or below 80% of the area median income, adjusted
for household size.
Thus far, courts have construed the meaning and intent of the first factor — whether an
application is a "occupant obligated to pay rent" — with varying results. However, it follows
that if courts have the authority to parse whether an applicant is eligible under one factor of
the statute, then courts have the authority to analyze eligibility under the other itemized
factors. This is especially true here, where the ERAP eligibility factors are not mutually
exclusive, contradictory, or stated in the disjunctive. To the contrary, the ERAP eligibility
factors are set forth in the conjunctive: A household is eligible for ERAP if (i), (ii), (iii) ". . .
and . . ." (iv) (emphasis added). (L 2021, c 56, part BB, subpart A, § 5 [1] [a] [i] — [iv].) In
other words, a "household" must be "a tenant or occupant obligated to pay rent in their
primary residence," which also "includes" the three continuative subsequent factors. (Id.)
Respondent has not denied that she reported to petitioner that her income in 2018 was
$143,113, and or that she is on a "fixed income." (NYSCEF Doc No. 46, respondent's
memorandum of law in support of motion sequence 3 at 7.) Thus, the court can assume that
there has been no change in her income since 2018.[FN3] Respondent implies through her
attorney that she has faced hardship because she is on a fixed income and asks the court to
surmise that said hardship is "due directly, or indirectly, from the COVID19 outbreak." (L
2021, c 56, part BB, subpart A, § 5 [1] [a] [ii]. However, nowhere in either respondent's or
her attorney's submissions is it stated that there was a reduction in her fixed income, or that
she has had difficulty paying [*4]rent from March 13, 2020 as a result of the COVID19

pandemic. (Id.) [FN4] Regardless, any such statement is repudiated by the undisputed rent
ledger proffered by petitioner which reflects that respondent has paid $1,255.00 per month,
every month including June 2022, since March 2020. (NYSEF Doc No. 32 at 12.) Nor has
respondent averred that her income is at or below either the 80% of area median income
("AMI"), as is required by the original statute,[FN5] or even 120% of the AMI, as required for
eligibility for state funded ERAP approval. Regardless of which program for which
respondent applied, the court takes judicial notice that 120% of the AMI for single
households in New York County in 2022 is $112,080.00.[FN6] ,[FN7]
The court also takes judicial notice of the OTDA website which, on June 24, 2022,
posted an "important update for ERAP applicants."[FN8] The update states in relevant part,
"The following applications submitted to the ERAP portal will be denied: Households that
have income over 80 percent of area median income." (Id.) The notice further states in
relevant part, "the statefunded program serving households with income over 80 percent and
up to 120 percent of area median income closed to new applications on February 14, 2022."
(Id.) Finally, the notice cautions as follows: "IMPORTANT NOTE: Applications from
subsidized housing tenants whose rent is limited to a certain percentage of income . . . are not
currently able to be paid . . . . Therefore, at this time, none of the subsidized housing
applications can be paid regardless of the date their application was submitted." While not
the foundation for this decision, this recently updated posting on the OTDA website
augments petitioner's argument that respondent's application is futile.
On a motion to challenge the ERAP stay, as with CEEFPA hardship declaration
challenges, it is respondent's burden to show entitlement to the protections of the stay. (See
Harbor Tech LLC v Correa, 73 Misc 3d 1211 [A] [Civ Ct, Kings County 2021] [stating that a
judge has the discretion to deviate from the general rules of presentation of evidence
regarding a tenant's personal financial situation where the tenant's experience of hardship
must be determined.) "When the facts required to resolve an issue are within the exclusive
knowledge and control of a respondent, it is generally inappropriate to place the burden of
proof with respect to that issue on a petitioner." (Pappas v Corfian Enterprises, Ltd., 22 Misc
3d 1113 [A], aff'd, 76 AD3d 679 [2d Dept 2010] [internal quotations and citations omitted;
Johnson v City of New York, 302 AD2d 463, 464 [2d Dept 2003] ["it is generally
inappropriate to place the burden of proof on a party in the case where the facts governing
the resolution of the controversy are [*5]within the exclusive knowledge of the opposing
party"].)

The court is troubled by the silence of respondent's affidavit in support regarding salient
issues. Respondent does not address why she believes in good faith that she is income
eligible for ERAP, or that her annual income is not in fact "fixed" at $143,113.00, or that she
suffered financial hardship directly or indirectly as a result of the COVID19 pandemic. (See
e.g. Noce v Kaufman, 2 NY2d 347, 353 [1957] [". . .where an adversary withholds evidence
in his possession or control that would be likely to support his version of the case, the
strongest inferences may be drawn against him which the opposing evidence in the record
permits" [internal citations omitted].) Respondent's suggestion that she may have a Fifth
Amendment privilege against selfincrimination is perplexing, though it could explain the
absence of statements supporting respondent's good faith belief as to her eligibility for ERAP.
(NYSCEF Doc No. 20, Martha Hunt affidavit in support of motion sequence 3 ¶ 10.)
Here, one is left to speculate as to what hardships befell respondent as a result of the
COVID19 pandemic. The evidence before the court, supports the conclusion that respondent
has a stable income of $143,113 per year and has been able to afford to pay rent in the
amount of $1,255.00 unfailingly during the entire COVID period. Respondent, who is in the
best position demonstrate eligibility for ERAP, has submitted no sworn statements to refute
petitioner's submissions.
Finally, without addressing petitioner's contention that she will not experience housing
instability or homelessness, L 2021, c 56, part BB, subpart A, § 5 (1) (a) (iii), respondent
states that she has "health issues that make moving a burden on me and put my life in danger
. . . In fact, I have a microvalve prolapse (heart condition) that puts me at risk; vacating
during the pandemic as a senior citizen may be deadly to me." (NYSCEF Doc No. 20,
Martha Hunt affidavit in support of motion sequence 3 ¶¶ 6, 7.) However, respondent has
conflated the definition of hardship under L 2021 c 417, part C subpart A § 1 (4) (b), and the
eligibility factors for ERAP.
The expired hardship declarations states in relevant part: "If you have lost income or
had increased costs during the COVID19 pandemic, or moving would pose a significant
health risk for you or a member of your household due to an increased risk for severe illness
or death from COVID19 due to an underlying medical condition, and you sign and deliver
this hardship declaration form to your landlord, you may be protected from eviction until at
least January 15, 2022 for nonpayment of rent or for holding over after the expiration of your
lease (emphasis added)." (Id.) Unlike the qualifications for a hardship declaration stay,
medical conditions and health risks are not part of the calculus regarding eligibility for
ERAP.

Respondent's attorney states that she did not advise her client to apply for ERAP but,
having informed her that she "may be eligible" for the program, respondent "believing that
she met [the] criteria, took it upon herself to file for ERAP." (NYSCEF Doc No. 46 at 9.)
Respondent's attorney states: "To be clear, [respondent] may qualify for ERAP under the
third bullet point [of the eligibility criteria]."[FN9] However, to be equally clear, as stated
before, nothing in the record supports respondent's contentions that she is eligible for ERAP
on the basis that she "experienced a reduction in household income, incurred significant
costs, or experienced other financial hardship due, directly or indirectly, to the COVID—19
outbreak," and that her income is [*6]less than 80%, or even 120% of the AMI. (L 2021, c
56, part BB, subpart A, § 5 [1] [a] [ii], [iv].) Neither does respondent support that she is at
risk of homelessness, or housing instability, id. at (iii), only that she has a medical condition
that will "make moving a burden" and that relocating could be "deadly." (NYSCEF Doc No.
20 ¶¶ 67.)
Respondents Motions to Reargue the September 11, 2019 Decision and Order and
Vacate the April 26, 2022 Decision and Order
Respondent's request to reargue the September 11, 2019 decision and order is a motion
that should properly be made before the issuing judge, Judge Ortiz. Respondent's motion to
reargue Judge Ortiz's decision before this judge is denied. (CPLR 2221 [d].)
The court further denies respondent's motion to "vacate" Judge Finkelstein's April 26,
2022 on the basis of CPLR 5015 (2). CPLR 5015 (2) states that a party may move the court
to relieve it from a judgment or order on the ground that there is "newlydiscovered evidence
which, if introduced at the trial, would probably have produced a different result and which
could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under section 4404."
Respondent presents no newly discovered evidence that would warrant a different result from
that rendered by Judge Finkelstein when he decided her previous order to show cause, or that
would require a "new trial." None of the arguments that respondent proposes are new or
novel to this case. If they have any merit at all, they will be subsumed in respondent's motion
before Judge Ortiz to reargue her September 11, 2019 decision and order.
As for respondent's argument pursuant to CPLR 5015 (4) that Judge Finkelstein's order
should be vacated on the grounds that the court is without subject matter jurisdiction to
render judgments or orders in this proceeding, respondent is also misguided. Any suggestion
that this court lacks subject matter over this proceeding is without merit. Such is an outdated

view that has long been invalidated. The Civil Court is vested with subject matter jurisdiction
over housing matters by statute. (NY City Civ Ct Act §§ 110, 204; see also 170 W. 85th St.
Tenants Assn. v Cruz, 173 AD2d 338, 339 [1st Dept 1991]).

Respondent's Application for a Stay Pursuant to RPAPL 753 (1)
Under the facts and circumstances of this case, respondent's application for a
discretionary stay on execution of the warrant is granted only to the extent that execution of
the warrant is stayed 10 days. Upon expiration of the 10day stay, petitioner may direct the
marshal to serve a notice of eviction. APS shall be notified prior to execution.
Sanctions
The court, in its discretion, declines to award sanctions.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, it is
ORDERED that petitioner's motion to vacate the ERAP stay is granted; and it is further
ORDERED that respondent's motion to reargue the September 19, 2019 decision and
order of the Hon. Frances Ortiz is denied without prejudice to making a proper motion before
Judge Ortiz; and it is further
ORDERED that respondent's motion to vacate the Hon. Marc Finkelstein's April 26,
2022 order is denied in its entirety; and it is further
ORDERED that petitioner's motion for sanctions is denied without prejudice.
This constitutes the decision and order of this court.
Dated: July 7, 2022
New York, NY
____________________________
HON. KAREN MAY BACDAYAN
Judge, Housing Part

Footnotes

Footnote 1 :According to petitioner's counsel on the record on June 28, 2022 (the second
appearance for oral argument), Thomas Donaldson, Esq. spoke on the record on behalf of
respondent at the argument before Judge Finkelstein, but never made a formal appearance as
counsel.
Footnote 2:The court notes that, based on the language quoted by respondent's attorney, she
meant to say "bullet point" two of the statute as the language comes direction from L 2021 c
56, part BB, subpart A§ 5 (1) (ii). If respondent's attorney was referring to the OTDA
website eligibility page, the court defers to the statute instead. The eligibility criteria are
more fully explicated below.
Footnote 3:In fact, the cost-of-living adjustment ("COLA") for recipients of Social Security
benefits was 5.9% in 2022. Social Security Administration website,
https://www.ssa.gov/cola/, (last accessed July 1, 2022). The COLA for a teacher's pension
will be 3% commencing September 2022. New York State Teachers Retirement System
website, bttps ·//www nystrs org/About-Us/Press-Room/Headljnes/Eligjble-Retjrees-toReceive-COLA-Increase (last accessed July 1, 2022.)
Footnote 4:ERAP will pay up to 15 months of rental arrears that accrued after March 13,
2020. L 2021, c 56, part BB, subpart A,§ 9. '"Rental arrears' [are defined as] unpaid rent
owed to the landlord that accrued on or after March 13, 2020." L 2021, c 56, part BB, subpart
A, § (2) (10).
Footnote 5:L 2021, c 56, part BB, subpart A,§ 5 [1] [a] [iv].)
Footnote 6:Department of Housing Preservation and Development,
https ·//www 1 nyc goy/site/hpd/seryjces-and-inforwation/area-median-income page, last
accessed June 30, 2022.)
Footnote 7:This court has discretion to take judicial notice of the information contained on
government websites. (See Matter ofLaSonde v Seabrook, 89AD3d 132, 137 n 8 [1st Dept
2011], citing Kingsbridge Jewish Med. Ctr. v Allstate Ins. Co., 61 AD 13 [2d Dept 2009].)
Footnote 8: OTDA website, bttps ·Uotda ny gov/programs/emergency-rental-assistance/ (last
accessed June 30, 2022).
Footnote 9: See n 2 above.
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